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“Better Unmentioned:” An Assessment of Reagan Administration Aid to Pakistan, Panama, and
Zaire.1
By Charles Sherrard.
In the 1940 movie Santa Fe Trail, then-actor Ronald Reagan plays the part of George
Custer, depicted in the film as a dashing young cavalry officer who fights against the abolitionist
John Brown (who is portrayed as a crazed radical) alongside the story’s main character, Errol
Flynn’s “Jeb” Stuart. There are some striking similarities between Reagan’s character in the film
and the image he helped foster during his presidency. Like Custer in the film, Reagan tried to
create a myth where he was the “cowboy” fighting against the radical Soviet Union alongside the
members of his cabinet. Reagan’s world was the world of movies, simple, uncomplicated, and
Manichean. He would even go as far as to wear cowboy boots publicly during his presidency. He
may have occupied the White House during his presidency, but as far as his mind was concerned,
he was in the Wild West.2
The problem was, it was all fiction. On February 16th, 1990, former President Ronald
Reagan sat in the witness box. His former National Security Adviser, John Poindexter, was on
trial, accused of lying to Congress about his involvement in the Iran-Contra Affair four years
before. When Poindexter’s attorney, Richard Beckler (who was beloved by the media for his
courtroom gesticulations and unorthodox questioning style) asked Reagan what he remembered
about his “dealings with an Asian country,” President Reagan responded that he had “never
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made any effort” to find out where the funds for the Contras were coming from, and that the
sources of that funding were “better unmentioned.”3 In hindsight, it seems almost surprising that
this statement did not generate more controversy at the time Reagan uttered it. Perhaps it was
simply due to how normal the statement must have seemed to the public after four years of
scandal. Whatever the reason, the truth is that the statement meant nothing less than an
admission by the President of the United States that he let his subordinates act with autonomy
and without supervision.4
Reagan gave those subordinates, mainly Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director
William Casey, unparalleled power, causing them to make huge mistakes. By operating with a
level of freedom not seen since the days of Allen Dulles a generation earlier. Casey wielded a
large amount of power over US foreign policy. However, Casey’s autonomy bypassed the rest of
the Reagan administration, to say nothing of Congress, and the resulting lack of oversight led
Casey to commit many unforced errors that would impact national security for decades. These
mistakes are important in a larger sense because we can learn from those errors to do better in the
future.5
A common criticism of histories of the Reagan administration is the argument that there
are not yet enough declassified sources to draw from to write an adequate history of the Reagan
administration. But, as the following pages will show, there are, in fact, many sources from
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where to draw evidence. Many of these critics point out the lack of Foreign Relations of the
United States (FRUS) documents as evidence of their argument. While it is true that very few
FRUS collections on the Reagan administration are declassified, some of those that are highly
relevant to this topic (particularly the collections on the Soviet Union, which contain much
information on the Reagan administration’s relationship with Pakistan) are available. To
compensate for the relative lack of FRUS documents, I have made extensive use of other
archives, such as the National Security Archive and the CIA Archive, to research the Reagan
administration’s relationship with Panama and Zaire. I have also obtained information from
newspaper and magazine articles from the period. Finally, some of the sources in this paper are
from interviews conducted by the writers of secondary literature.6
The Cold War had begun a little more than forty years prior to Reagan’s inauguration, as
Britain and France retreated from colonial power and the United States and the Soviet Union
became the preeminent world powers after the fall of Nazi Germany in 1945. In particular, as the
British slowly withdrew from their former colonies (beginning with India in 1947) they sought to
pass the imperial mantle to the United States, in order to continue waging the “Great Game,” or
the Anglo-Russian political rivalry in Asia that had been brewing since the 19th century.7
These international power dynamics increasingly led the United States to act out of what
have been perceived as “imperial” ambitions. However, these ambitions were nothing new. As
far back as the mid 19th century, American nationalism revolved around the belief that the nation
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had a divine right to expand from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean, regardless of the presence of
Mexicans and Native Americans who stood in the way. The Cold War represented an
international turn of these trends with strong British encouragement.8
After the end of the Second World War, American involvement in the Cold War quickly
escalated. The covert schemes of the John Foster and Allen Dulles, who organized the toppling
of moderate regimes and their replacement with pro-western puppets, gradually evolved into the
quagmire in Vietnam. The Vietnam War, which began as an effort to help France keep control of
its Vietnamese colony, slowly escalated until the United States was openly fighting a war on
behalf of the South Vietnamese government against North Vietnam. The war’s huge cost in
human life (both American and Vietnamese) led the United States to be hesitant to commit
troops to future conflicts. By 1976, one year after the Vietnam War had ended in defeat for the
United States, many Americans thought their country was in a state of decline. Four years of
Soviet advances during the Jimmy Carter administration would only cause that idea to grow.
However, Carter was defeated in the 1980 presidential election by Ronald Reagan.9
The outline for the “Reagan doctrine,” can be found in future Reagan administration
Ambassador to the United Nations’ Jeanne Kirkpatrick’s 1979 essay “Dictatorships and Double
Standards.” Kirkpatrick argues that Carter had abandoned the Shah of Iran and Nicaraguan
dictator Anastasio Somoza to revolutionary forces out of an interest in human rights, but against
the best interests of the US. Kirkpatrick’s argument in favor of supporting right-wing
dictatorships would later become a key part of the “Reagan Doctrine.” Kirkpatrick’s ideologies
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had an earlier precedent in the former Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. A fanatical
Presbyterian, Dulles believed that the Soviet Union would stop at nothing to impose its idea of
communism upon the rest of the world. John Foster Dulles’ anti-communist zeal would find
successors in Kirkpatrick, Bill Casey, and Oliver North.10
Casey’s chief flaw was his fanaticism. His refusal to negotiate, and his tendency to see
world politics as a zero-sum game crippled his government’s ability to negotiate solutions to
long, drawn out conflicts. Like Dulles before him, he saw the Cold War as an almost religious
struggle between good and evil. Because Reagan gave him so much power over policy, Casey’s
fanaticism then became a part of the CIA and US foreign policy. Casey’s zealousness became
inseparable from the “Reagan” administration’s worldview for six years, until the Iran-Contra
Affair became news and Casey resigned from the CIA.11
Casey’s resignation allowed other figures, such as the long-neglected Secretary of State
George Shultz, (as well as First Lady Nancy Reagan) to come to the fore. Casey’s fall brought
about an immediate shift in the administration’s decision making. Under the control of this new,
less hardline faction, the administration began seeing results. Shultz supported a Central
American peace deal, negotiated by the President of Costa Rica, Oscar Arias, that saw free
elections take place in Nicaragua in 1990. These elections resulted in the fall of the Sandinista
government that the administration had been trying to remove since the beginning of Reagan’s
first term. During this time, Reagan also achieved a great deal of progress towards nuclear arms
control in summit meetings with Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev.12

10

. Perisco, Casey, 181, Kinzer, The Brothers, 279
Reagan Testimony in the Trial of John Poindexter, Part II, C-Span Archives.
12
George Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Charles Scribner’s
Sons, 1991) Kindle Edition, loc 14150
11

7

In his book A Twilight Struggle: American Power and Nicaragua, 1979-1990, Robert
Kagan argues that the 1990 Nicaraguan elections (which were certified by international
observers) only happened because of the Contra War. He is largely correct. However, Kagan
implicitly attacks the Oliver North/Bill Casey wing of the Reagan administration (which opposed
negotiations with the Sandinistas and which he, as a State Department official, would have been
in opposition to) when he claims that “Reagan’s policies, unmodified by the Arias plan or by
Congress, would probably have meant many years of inconclusive struggle in Nicaragua.”13 It
was this hardliner faction that sought to aid Noriega as part of the Contra War. Kagan’s thesis is
given weight by the fact that we saw his prediction come true in two other countries, Afghanistan
(through American aid to Pakistan) and the Congo. I use Kagan’s argument to frame what the
Reagan administration considered American interests, and to lay out the strategy of a moderate
wing of the administration’s members.14
The Reagan administration was disinterested in tying up the loose ends of conflicts in
Pakistan and Zaire to prevent negative long-term consequences. Perhaps the rise of the Taliban
in Afghanistan and the rise of Chinese influence in the Congo could have been prevented if the
conflicts in those regions had been concluded and the countries themselves allowed to rebuild.
Had it not been for the Arias plan in Central America, might we be seeing terrorist attacks
coming from that region now? And had we been willing to make an agreement with the USSR to
form a transitional coalition government in Afghanistan and to formulate a peace plan for Central
Africa, would we be so worried about those regions today?15
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The strategy that I will apply to the contexts of all three regions (because it is the strategy
that provoked so much ire from Casey and the other hardliners) has been referred to by theorists
and historians as “linkage.”16 “Linkage” was a policy associated with the Nixon and Ford
administrations in the 1970s, and its most famous proponent was then National Security Adviser
Henry Kissinger.17 It was then carried on through some Reagan era officials, especially in the
State Department. Kissinger’s policies defined an era of the Cold War that would become know
as the period of Détente, because of its relative peace between the United States and the Soviet
Union. Built off of George Kennan’s idea of “containment,” or preventing Marxism from
gaining new territory, “linkage” consisted of negotiating with the Soviet Union in order to
produce results favorable to both power blocs. To do this, the Nixon and Ford administrations
would either offer concessions or apply pressure to the Soviet Union to induce them to agree to a
certain demand.18
By the time Casey resigned, though, the damage had been done. Aid to the anti Soviet
mujahideen fighters in Afghanistan had allowed religious fundamentalism to grow exponentially
in that country. Casey’s allies who had managed to survive the Iran-Contra scandal, mainly
National Security Adviser Frank Carlucci and Deputy National Security Adviser Colin Powell,
combined with the Pakistani dictator Zia ul-Haq, sabotaged an agreement between the Soviet
Union and the United States that would have established a power sharing coalition government
in Afghanistan. In Central America, an illegal drug trade aided by Casey’s ally, the Panamanian
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dictator Manuel Noriega, would continue to expand. And in Zaire/Congo, Casey’s blind eye to
Chinese influence would see that country drift further into the Chinese sphere of influence.19
By failing to negotiate, the Reagan administration left these regions behind to stew in the
mess that Casey and Reagan had created. Negotiated settlements could possibly have provided
lasting ends to the regional problems that plagued Afghanistan and Central Africa, as they did
with Central America (albeit not with the drug problem). But Casey and Reagan left them to
fester. These solutions did not need to come at the price of accepting leftist expansion or ceasing
to pressure the Soviet Union. On the contrary, they represent missed opportunities that could
have led to new allies for the United States led faction of the Cold War. At minimum, they would
have squeezed the Soviet Union closer to its own borders at a time when it struggled to contain
uprisings in Eastern Europe (something it would ultimately fail to accomplish). Reagan’s utter
dependence on Casey not only caused long term problems in US foreign policy, but also did not
contribute to the fall of the Soviet Union. I choose these dictatorships in particular in for their
geographic balance and because of the centrality that each had in the internal discussions of the
Reagan administration.20
This is different from how most historians have viewed the Reagan administration. His
admirers, obviously, have defended him, claiming that he directed foreign policy and brought
down the Soviet Union. His detractors, however, also give him too much credit. In their rush to
criticize Reagan over his handling of the Iran-Contra Affair (which he generally deserves) they
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claim that Reagan was the mastermind behind the scheme, an “Imperial President” making
decisions unilaterally. The truth is arguably worse. Reagan simply did not know enough about
foreign policy to keep subordinates he liked from doing whatever they wanted. A strategy that
would later become known as the “Reagan Doctrine” really had little to do with Reagan at all. 21
Internal Dynamics of the Reagan Administration.
Sean Wilentz’s book The Age of Reagan is a case in point. While the book is overall a
fine piece of literature dealing with a topic that few academics have the courage to write about,
he may assign Reagan too much agency in his book. Wilentz criticizes the public desire for a
“smoking gun,” indicating that Reagan planned the Iran-Contra scheme, but does not offer
alternative evidence to back up what he claims Reagan did. It is entirely plausible that Reagan
did know about Casey’s activities during the Iran-Contra Affair and feigned ignorance to
maintain deniability. However, to accuse Reagan of lying about his involvement in the IranContra scandal would be to accuse him of perjuring himself during the Poindexter trial,
something that I am not willing to do without strong evidence to the contrary. In any event,
Casey directed US foreign policy, with or without Reagan’s oversight.22
Famed Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis’ assessment of the Reagan administration
is also somewhat incomplete. In his analysis of the Reagan years, Gaddis focuses on how Reagan
was able to highlight human rights issues in the USSR (which, although certainly an important
contribution on Reagan’s part, was not invented by him—human rights had been an issue ever
since the Helsinki Final Act agreement), negotiations with Gorbachev over nuclear arms
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reductions (which had precedent in the SALT talks) and the escalation of force against Soviet
advances in the third world. Furthermore, Gaddis describes Reagan as a bright strategic thinker
who was independent from his advisers. 23
Gaddis does not include how CIA director William Casey (who had been Reagan’s
campaign manager during his 1980 election campaign and so enjoyed a close relationship with
the President that Secretary of State George Shultz and other state department officials did not
have) operated with a shocking amount of autonomy during the Contra War. Indeed, if Reagan
was such a bold and clear thinker, why was he clearly unable to resolve the intense factionalism
that pervaded his administration? Even during the campaign, Reagan relied on Casey, referring
to him as “the expert.”24 When he did pick a side, he most often picked the faction that had the
closest relationship with him personally, that is, the Casey/Kirkpatrick/Weinberger faction.
Shultz’s credibility was so damaged by this exclusion that it compromised his effectiveness as
secretary of state, as evidenced by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevernadze’s statement that
“the Secretary of State said one thing; other members of the Administration did something
else.”25
For all these mistakes, did Reagan/Casey really accomplish what his fiercest defenders
say he did, the destruction of the Soviet Union? He may certainly have hastened it. The Soviet
war in Afghanistan not only crippled the once proud Red Army and slaughtered thousands of
young Russian men, but permanently changed the Soviet psyche as well. Soviet citizens became
as disillusioned with their country during the 1980s as Americas had with the United States
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during the 1960s with the Vietnam War. The difference was that the United States had the
flexibility to adapt to and manipulate public opinion via the democratic system, an advantage the
Soviet Union did not possess. However, the ultimate fall of the Soviet Union lay in the hands of
larger historical forces. The Soviet economy was in desperate shape by the time Gorbachev took
power in 1985. Ultimately, the Soviet system was able to keep up a façade of stability for the
first half century of its existence, but by the 1980s, it began to crash. This is important point to
note in this paper because it is a key part of assessing the overall impact of the Reagan
administration’s policies.26
Détente’s detractors believed that “linkage” failed because it assumed that the Soviets
would be willing to follow through on their negotiated agreements. These broken promises led
first to the isolationism of the Carter administration and then the aggression of the Reagan era.
However, I believe that the policy of linkage failed not because of naivete, but because of an
obsession (typical of most Cold War thinkers) with the Soviet Union and relied too much on the
USSR to achieve its goals. This paper will argue that a series of negotiations with a series of
different countries (Tanzania, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, and the USSR) would have had a much
greater short and long-term benefits for the United States.27
In this section, I will analyze the internal dynamics of the Reagan Administration. I will
make use of memoirs from administration figures to get a sense of how they may have felt about
one another. I will also make use of accounts of the Reagan administration CIA by Bob
Woodward and Joe Perisco. Finally, the court testimony during the Iran Contra Affair,
specifically the Poindexter trial, has been very helpful. Reagan’s memoirs and diaries have also
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proven useful. In this section, I will make the claim that the Reagan administration was not
controlled by a strong President Reagan as is often believed, but that in fact most of the internal
authority over foreign policy in the administration was ceded to CIA Director Casey, much to the
consternation of other administration officials such as Secretary of State George Shultz.28
Casey and Shultz were certainly enemies. Shultz attacked Casey in his memoirs, stating that he
was “increasingly uneasy about him.”29 Shultz felt (correctly) that Casey was an ideologue who
was obsessed with attacking the Soviet Union, Sandinista Nicaragua, and their allies. Many of
Shultz’s concerns would be borne out as Casey launched one reckless foreign policy decision
after another, most notably in the cases of mining in Nicaragua and with US support to Noriega.
For their part, Casey’s allies hated Shultz, with Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North stating that
Shultz was “ambitious” and someone who wanted to take all the credit for any foreign policy
accomplishments (which more accurately describes North than it does Shultz).30
When Reagan did side with Shultz, he did it to appease a more liberal faction of the
Republican Party that was still alive and to some degree powerful during the 1980s. Republicans
like Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker and even the National Review magazine editor
William Buckley had supported the Panama Canal Treaties in 1978 and had an ideological
commitment to the old ideas of détente. When Gaddis states that Reagan wrote that scolding
Casey “has to be done,” what he seems to miss is that Reagan meant that it “has to be done” for
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political reasons, not ideological ones. This ability to keep the different factions of the
Republican Party at relative peace with one another was one of Reagan’s two political strengths.
After beginning his conservative activism as an actor in Hollywood, he further honed these skills
as the Governor of California from 1967-73, and finally perfected them during his two
presidential runs in 1976 and 1980. He had been a part of the Republican party for a generation,
and he knew it inside and out by the time he became president.31
However, nothing in Reagan’s background had prepared him for foreign policy. He had
never been a member of Congress or worked for the state department or one of the other
agencies that dealt with the diplomacy of the United States. This lack of experience is why he
left much of his foreign policy strategy to Casey, who had been an intelligence agent as part of
the OSS (Office of Strategic Services) during World War II. The closest his experience ever
came to foreign policy was his service during the Second World War, and that had mostly
included making movies for the troops (which helped more with his ability to woo an audience
than it did his foreign policy skills).32
Reagan’s screen career leads us to his other political strength, the power of his
personality, which Gaddis also pays much attention to. Many times, it seems as though Gaddis is
critiquing the image of Reagan rather than the record of the Reagan presidency. Of course,
Gaddis wrote that edition in 2005, so it is possible that he was not privy to documents that have
been more recently declassified. However, he still had access to a number of memoirs from
Reagan administration officials (some of which he cites) which should have given him a more
nuanced view of the Reagan years. He was also writing during the height of the Reagan era, at a
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time when Reagan seemed a much stronger political figure than he does now. Gaddis my have
also treated Reagan the way he did because that in turn helped his larger thesis that the
“strategies of containment” were what won the Cold War for the United States. Finally, Gaddis
is widely considered to lean conservatively in his analysis of the Cold War. Regardless, it is
certain that years of acting experience had given Reagan a warm public persona, a soothing
voice, and unrivaled charisma.33
Reagan’s image was certainly one that he cultivated meticulously throughout his life.
Indeed, Wilentz writes that he, like many children of alcoholics (his father was a heavy drinker)
had trouble separating fantasy from reality. Reagan seems to have almost needed the image of
himself as a tough, “all-American” guy who was fighting against chaos for the sake of “the
American way.” Politics simply served as another way for Reagan to advance that image to
greater heights. Even while he was in office, he would hold movie displays on a regular basis,
and often seemed to know more about politics than he did about diplomacy. His time in film
influenced the way he saw international politics. In The Santa Fe Trail, the people of color in
the film are portrayed without agency, just as Reagan and his accomplices would see Pakistanis,
Panamanians, and Zairians during his time in office. The picture of Reagan as a cowboy may
have won Reagan fame on the big screen and votes as a politician, but it did not lend him foreign
policy experience. This would lead a void for others to fill.34
Reagan’s admirers are incorrect in stating that there was no central Kissinger-like figure
in the Reagan White House. For the first six years of the Reagan administration, Casey filled that
role for Reagan, and his role only disappeared with his death in 1987. Casey was the first CIA
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Director to have Cabinet rank, and the first to have an office adjacent to the White House in
addition to the regular one at the CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. For the first six years of
his administration, Reagan was content to give Casey carte blanche in supporting the Nicaraguan
and Afghan insurgencies. Casey was the chief planner behind the aid to the Afghan mujahideen;
and would launch a covert operation to lay mines off the coast of Nicaragua. When the
Nicaraguan operation was discovered by a reporter at the New York Times, both Republican and
Democratic Senators (including the famed arch conservative Barry Goldwater) became infuriated
with Casey hauling him before their committees to explain himself. Robert Pastor (a former
Carter administration official) also blamed Casey for Haig’s resignation in 1982, stating that
Haig had opposed Casey’s Contra strategy, but that Casey had “isolated” Haig.35
However, Shultz had opposed the Nicaraguan mining operation. In his memoirs he states
that he “strongly opposed” Casey’s mining proposal at a NSPG (National Security Planning
Group) meeting on May 31st, 1983.36 This assertion is backed up by documentation of a different
NSPG meeting on June 24th, 1984, where Shultz states that “no mines” should be part of the US
aid to the Contras. While it should be noted that this meeting took place after knowledge of the
mines became public, Shultz was the only person at the meeting to voice opposition to mining.37
However, according to Shultz, Reagan overruled him without his knowledge and authorized
Casey to carry out the mining operation. An anonymous CIA source speaking with reporter Bob
Woodward would contradict Shultz’s account, stating that Shultz said “fine” when asked to give
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his assent to the mining operation.38 Regardless, however, Shultz opposed the operation before
Reagan made the decision to go ahead with it anyway (backing Casey over Shultz’s objections in
a decision emblematic of Reagan’s preference for Casey) according to both sources. Shultz
would later describe the mining debacle as “a political disaster for the administration.”39
Casey also did not get along with Reagan’s first Chief of Staff, James Baker. Baker had
managed George H.W Bush’s presidential campaign in 1980, when Bush was Reagan’s
Republican primary opponent rather than his running mate. The conflict of the Republican
presidential primaries immediately created competition between Baker and Casey at the very
beginning. Once Reagan had won the Republican nomination, Baker joined Reagan’s campaign
in order to help him win the general election against then President Carter. However, Baker and
Casey still clashed. Before the first debate between Reagan and Carter, Casey stole copies of
Carter’s debate preparation notes. Casey and Baker disagreed about what to do with them.
Eventually the feud escalated into a scandal that nearly convinced Reagan to force Baker and
Casey to undergo polygraph tests to ascertain who was telling the truth.40
Baker and Casey’s rivalry continued well into Reagan’s time at the White House. When
Reagan’s National Security Adviser, William Clark (who was a member of the Casey wing of
the cabinet) resigned, Baker and Kirkpatrick both seemed likely candidates to take over that
position. Kirkpatrick, herself a hardliner, was backed by Casey. However, Baker was able to
convince Reagan to appoint him to the post. But, before he could be formally appointed, Casey
and Kirkpatrick persuaded Reagan not to go with Baker. Instead, Clark’s deputy, Robert
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McFarlane, became the new National Security Adviser. The press considered McFarlane to be a
“compromise candidate” between Kirkpatrick and Baker, but in practice he tended to side with
the Casey faction. That was as close as the Baker/Shultz wing of the administration ever got to
wresting control away from the Casey faction for years. They would not get another chance until
1987 in the wake of the Iran-Contra scandal.41
Casey was a complicated figure. A product of Tammany Hall and the Catholic Church,
each of those two institutions gave him qualities that he would take to the Reagan administration.
The tough, almost gangster like mentality of Tammany Hall combined with his religiosity to
produce a kind of faith in himself and his equally high ambitions that was of almost fanatical
proportions. His social class also influenced how he saw the rest of the administration. As
someone whose family was nouveau bourgeois, he held both a disdain for the poor and a
contempt for the rich that made him many enemies. He saw many of the poor as leeches who
sucked the blood of the bourgeoise like himself. As for the rich, he viewed them as upper crust
snobs who did not understand street-smart people like him. When viewed in combination, they
paint a picture of someone who is disgusted with those he deemed “below” him, while frustrated
by his inability to gain entrance to the ranks of those “above.” This economic situation hardened
his ambitions and fanaticism still further.42
Casey had also been a part of the Office of Secret Services (OSS) during the Second
World War. Like the Cold War as a whole, the OSS had been created at the behest of the British
government, wo wanted the US to have an intelligence arm against both the German and later the
Soviets. The British had also pushed the United States to get involved with the Cold War more
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broadly, as a way to pass on their declining empire. Like his predecessor as CIA Director, Allen
Dulles, Casey had been a protégé of the OSS’ leader, the bold and flamboyant William “Wild
Bill” Donovan. Donovan placed an emphasis on incorrect action over inaction. Both Casey and
Dulles would take that mentality to the CIA later on in their careers. Combined with his brother,
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, CIA Director Allen Dulles would mastermind coups in
Iran, Guatemala, and the Congo (where the coup, led by future Zairian dictator Joseph Mobutu,
would overthrow a Congolese leader who would become an icon for the left, Patrice Lumumba).
In all three of these cases, the overthrow of moderates led to vacuums that deprived US foreign
policy of a generation of moderates that they might have had had they been able to sway these
leaders to the US camp (or at least nonalignment). US President John F. Kennedy would later
fire Dulles after the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961. The influence of
Donovan clearly left a mark on both Dulles and Casey. But, due to his proximity to President
Reagan, Casey would go on to obtain an even more dangerous level of power.43
Why was Reagan so ready to trust Casey specifically so completely with situations that
had a profound impact on the security of the United States? Studying Reagan and his writings
leads to two reasons, both of which were important to understanding the Reagan-Casey
relationship. The first reason has to do with political loyalty. Two of the other hardliners inside
the Reagan administration were Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger and Attorney General
Edwin Meese. Both had been with Reagan since his tenure as the governor of California, and so
commanded a great deal of loyalty from him. Weinberger in particular had a rocky relationship
with Shultz. The two had clashed over Weinberger’s support for Casey as well as committing US
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troops into Lebanon. Weinberger, aware of former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara’s
Vietnam War-related infamous legacy, did not want to contribute troops to a potential quagmire.
Shultz acknowledged in his memoirs that Weinberger enjoyed a closer relationship with Reagan
than he did, and attributed Weinberger’s influence to his closeness with the president.44
Meese’s relationship with Casey was slightly more complicated. Another member of
Reagan’s staff during his time as governor, he maintained his support of the Casey faction once
Reagan won the presidency. But he kept a good relationship with Chief of Staff Baker, with Haig
even accusing Meese of being part of a moderate “troika” made up of Meese, Baker, and Baker’s
deputy Mike Deaver.45 Meese’s position as Attorney General (a position not directly related to
foreign policy) no doubt allowed him to remain aloof from the rest of the factional battles that
engulfed the Reagan administration’s foreign policy team. However, Meese would take a more
cautious line then the rest of the hardliners on the Iran-Contra scandal. Aware that the scandal
could tarnish his record as Attorney General, Meese initially was hesitant to back the plan.
Eventually, however, he went into line behind the other hardliners, and supported the initiative
before the scandal broke in 1986.46
The other reason behind Reagan’s attachment to Casey may have had to do with
Reagan’s origins. Reagan almost certainly identified with Casey, as both were, in Reagan’s mind
at least, Irish Catholic men who “pulled themselves up by their bootstraps” to fame and fortune.
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While there is no direct evidence that either individual saw the other in this vein, it is most likely
true given the closeness of their relationship and the similarity of their backgrounds.47
Casey’s sway over Reagan also came through political pressure. Casey had long been a
part of the “new right” that had been slowly growing since the days of the Eisenhower
administration. This movement gained strength thanks to the perceived failures of détente in
preventing the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the fall of the regime of Anastasio Somoza in
Nicaragua, and the Iran hostage crisis. The Panama Canal Treaty of 1978, negotiated by
Reagan’s opponent Jimmy Carter, also gave fuel to a movement that saw the treaty as a
surrender of sovereign US territory. Casey’s allies in the Reagan administration were icons of the
new right such as Jeane Kirkpatrick and Cap Weinberger. Additionally, Casey had befriended
prominent right-wing publisher William Buckley, even going as far as to give financial advice to
Buckley on how best to manage his magazine, The National Review. All this made it hard for
Reagan to ignore Casey. It is even possible that Casey may have had as much influence over an
unwilling Reagan as he had when the president was eager to go along with his plan. Casey and
the “new right” had secured Reagan the Republican Party nomination in 1980, and Casey and his
allies were not about to let the president forget that.48
When Casey tried to persuade Reagan to give him the post of Secretary of State, First
Lady Nancy Reagan convinced the president to appoint Al Haig, someone more palatable to the
Baker/Shultz wing of the cabinet. Nancy Reagan, far more active in the internal politics of the
White House than the president himself was, became the strongest voice for moderation in the
Reagan administration. After the Iran-Contra scandal broke in 1986, it was Nancy Reagan who
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filled the position Casey had previously occupied. Together with Shultz, Baker, and White
House Deputy Chief of Staff Mike Deaver, Nancy Reagan put the country on a course back
toward a more moderate foreign policy. Her main legacy as First Lady is one that is mostly
unknown. This is a point that has been largely unstudied by scholars; and should be one of the
primary topics for future histories of the Reagan Administration.49
Casey’s death from a brain tumor in 1987, combined with the Iran-Contra scandal, which
made a Democratic congress even more hesitant to support the Contras than it had been
previously, was enough to force the Reagan administration into accepting the Arias negotiations
in Central America. Before his death, Casey had tried to sabotage Arias, intimidate him into
backing down, and even invited him to the White House so that he could be ambushed by Casey
and Reagan. “We can’t put ourselves in the hands of little Central American countries!” Casey
stated at one NSPG (National Security Planning Group) meeting.50 But the Iran-Contra scandal
made the Casey/McFarlane Contra strategy politically impossible. Arias had met with
Democratic House Speaker Jim Wright and gotten him to throw his support behind Arias’ plan.
From then on, any Contra strategy had to be tied to the Arias plan.51

“Time Says Nancy Reagan Acquires Political Clout,” CIA Electronic Reading Room, 1
“Minutes of A National Security Planning Group Meeting,” 5/16/86, NSA Archive BB 283, 6
51
Kagan, A Twilight Struggle, 532
49
50

23

Pakistan
On December 7, 1982, President Reagan and Zia ul-Haq, the then dictator of Pakistan,
met at a reception at the White House to affirm their alliance against the Soviet Union. While Zia
and Reagan stood on opposite sides of the room, Reagan began a speech. Reagan lauded Zia for
what he said was the dictator’s “desire for peace in South Asia.”52 Quoting a proverb by the
Pakistani poet Muhammed Iqbal about “seeking,” the President stated that “the US and Pakistan
are seeking the same goals.”53 The leaders then toasted one another as they resolved to continue
the Pakistani-American alliance.54
Only, they were not in fact seeking the same goals, at least not over the long term.
Despite the alliance between the US and the Pakistani governments that had been forged in the
wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the two countries were set on a collision
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course over the next two decades. Thanks to Reagan’s actions, Pakistani government influence in
Afghanistan would continue to grow to the detriment of American interests. The fall of
Afghanistan into the Pakistani government’s sphere of influence precipitated a rise in radicalism
in Afghanistan. The Pakistani government’s Saudi monarchical allies would also bring
problems, as they funded a generation of Arab extremists who would spread anti-American
ideology across the Middle East.55
The Pakistani government’s new influence in Afghanistan would cause problems to begin
to mount across the Middle East and South Asia. When the Soviet backed dictator of
Afghanistan, Muhammad Najibullah, was overthrown by the rebel mujahideen forces in 1991,
several different mujahideen factions fought for control, plunging the country into chaos. For
five years, the battle for control of Afghanistan raged between different factions of the
mujahideen. This ended in 1996 with the beginning of Taliban rule in the country. At first, the
Taliban claimed that they were no different from other radical governments who had ties to the
United States, including Saudi Arabia. But they decided to shelter another veteran of the SovietAfghan War, Osama bin-Laden, in the country. Bin Laden was already on the run from the
United States as a result of the bombings he organized in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. A Saudi
national, he had joined the Afghan War in the 1980s as a middleman between the Saudi
government and the mujahideen. His involvement in the war coincided with the introduction of
Arab mujahideen fighters into Afghanistan, many of whom would later return to their country of
origin to drive radical politics there as well. In 2001, the combined influences of the Saudi
monarchy’s and the Pakistani government’s power in Afghanistan cumulated in the attacks of
September 11th, which killed thousands of American citizens. The timeline of events that led to
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that day was long and complicated, and spanned over twenty years. It would begin, however,
with the Reagan administration’s support of the mujahideen in the 1980s.56
In this section, I will analyze the Reagan administration’s aid to the Pakistani government
in the context of the Anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan. Recently declassified State Department
archives have provided a huge help to my research in this section. The NSA archive and Gordon
Corera’s book Shopping for Bombs have been useful in finding material on the Pakistani
government’s nuclear weapons program. Finally, Steve Coll’s book Ghost Wars provides an
excellent reference point on the CIA’s support to the Afghan mujahideen. Memoirs of
administration figures also help. In this section, I argue that the lack of a comprehensive solution
to the Afghan crisis allowed militancy in Afghanistan and the wider Middle East and the
Pakistani government’s nuclear weapons program to spiral out of control.57
The Jimmy Carter administration had distanced the United States from Pakistan in the
late 1970s because of Zia’s determination that Pakistan should build a nuclear weapon Driven by
its commitment to the idea of human rights, the Carter administration’s relationship with
Pakistan had grown still colder after Zia’s military coup in 1977. Upon the advice of Carter’s
National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, the CIA began arming the Pakistani army to
help the mujahideen after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, but Zia publicly
disparaged this aid, calling it “peanuts.”58 The Reagan administration was determined to expand
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upon Brzezinski’s plan, making Afghanistan a centerpiece of their plan to counter Soviet
influence59
Initially, the Reagan administration was careful to be sensitive in their support of Zia. A
NSPG meeting deliberated the size of the administration’s military aid package to the Pakistani
government. Mindful of an American public still hesitant about Zia due to his human rights
abuses and the Pakistani government’s nuclear program, the administration was careful in how it
presented its help to the Pakistani army. Nonetheless, they were also determined to dramatically
increase American support of Zia, stating that they wanted to send “at least 100 million dollars”
more than Carter’s program.60
The Reagan administration quickly became convinced that it could not make a serious
attempt to quash the Pakistani government’s nuclear program while at the same time expecting
Zia to continue his program of aid to the mujahideen. An administration report in 1981 stated
that Zia “will never give up the program” because it was essential to his popularity.61 The same
report stated that there was a good chance for a US-Pakistani alliance due to the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan, claiming that “the stage is set for improvement.”62 The report concluded by
arguing that “US interests in aiding Pakistan are closely related to US national security and are
certainly not negated by the drawbacks to that aid.”63
Still, the Reagan administration continued to present an appearance of trying to attempt to
persuade Zia to abandon the nuclear program. Secretary of State Alexander Haig (who was
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Reagan’s Secretary of State until he was replaced by Shultz in 1983) wrote that the US “would
choose to cut of assistance” in the event of a Pakistani government nuclear test.64 Reagan
discussed the Pakistani nuclear program at the meeting mentioned above on December 7th, 1982.
Reagan would write that Zia “gave me his word that they were not building an atomic bomb.”65
Reagan stated this despite being told by Shultz that there was “overwhelming evidence” that Zia
was lying.66 However, Shultz also wrote that the Reagan administration could not pull its support
from Zia’s regime because of the chance that Zia would end his support of the mujahideen. The
Reagan administration essentially allowed the Pakistani government’s nuclear program to thrive
because they were so focused on the mujahideen.67
In doing so, the Reagan administration ignored the fact that the Pakistani government’s
nuclear program was being financed in part by enemies of the United States. Libyan dictator
Muammar Gaddafi, the same individual who Reagan had referred to as a “tyrant” had been
helping the Pakistani nuclear program since the 1970s when Pakistan was under the leadership of
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.68 Libyan support of the program included financial assistance and a failed
attempt to supply Pakistan with uranium through the country of Niger. Whether or not the
Reagan administration had connected the dots between Zia and Gaddafi or not, they should have
foreseen the potential for such an alliance. Both Gaddafi and Zia were led by fundamentalist
ideologies, and both were attracted to the idea of building “an Islamic bomb.”69 However,
cooperation between the Libyan and Pakistani governments’ nuclear programs in the 1980s
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would only be the beginning of how the Pakistani government’s nuclear program would lead to a
flood of nuclear proliferation among some of the US’s fiercest adversaries. The Pakistani
government’s nuclear program would be boosted by a Pakistani metallurgist named AQ Khan.70
AQ Khan trained to be a metallurgist in Germany. After graduating, he got a job working
for a state-owned nuclear company in the Netherlands. Taking advantage of his position as an
interpreter for the company, Khan sent many secret Dutch documents back to Pakistan. A few
years later, then Pakistani President Zulfikar Bhutto would recall Khan to his birth country to
work on the Pakistani government’s nuclear program. Not content with being one of the
Pakistani government’s top officials in the nuclear program, he would go on to sell nuclear
material and designs to a number of regimes that had dubious reputations.71
It is possible that Khan’s deal with Iran originated with Zia himself. The war in
Afghanistan had seen the predominantly Shia Iran and predominantly Sunni Pakistan join forces
in an unlikely alliance against the Soviet Union, although they backed different groups which
began feuding with each other after the fall of Najibullah in 1991. Although it is probable that
the Pakistani government only sold the Iranian government spare parts from their own nuclear
program, BBC journalist Gordon Corera believes that the Pakistani aid did help the Iranians
advance their nuclear ambitions and evade western sanctions.72 For its part, the United States
also helped Iran during the 1980s with the infamous missile shipments that became a central part
of the Iran-Contra scandal. Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, who coordinated the missile
shipment, would later justify his actions by stating that some of the weapons delivered to the
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Iranian government wound up in the hands of the mujahideen. A generation later, politicians in
the United States would seriously consider going to war with Iran over its nuclear program..73
Iran would be far from Khan and the Pakistani government’s only customer. North Korea
was also looking to buy material and designs from Khan. In the 1990s, after Pakistan was able to
successfully detonate a nuclear bomb, Pakistani President Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of
Zulfikar Bhutto, who had begun the Pakistani nuclear program, went on a visit to North Korea.
Bhutto struck a deal that gave the Pakistani military the design for a North Korean long range
rocket. In return, North Korea would receive parts and designs for its own nuclear program.
Khan went to North Korea no less than thirteen times over five years.74 Again, given how much
the North Korean nuclear program has troubled US policymakers, these developments should not
be taken lightly.75
Finally, Khan made a deal with Gaddafi’s regime in Libya. Three decades of PakistaniLibyan cooperation reached their pinnacle. An entire generation’s worth of US foreign policy
regarding North and Central Africa was almost destroyed due to the American policy of ignoring
Khan. Libya would eventually dismantle its nuclear program in the 2000s before the Gaddafi
regime was toppled by rebels in 2011, but Khan and the Pakistani government had done their
best to make sure that the Libyans developed nuclear weapons.76
The Pakistani government’s nuclear arsenal has also weakened the US position towards
Pakistan itself. Pakistani politician and academic Husain Haqqani regards the nuclear weapons as
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a main instrument of military power over the civilian government.77 Additionally, the Pakistani
government has used American concerns about non proliferation as leverage in its negotiations
with the United States. Christine C. Fair writes that the United States is now committed to
mediating any conflict that arises between India and Pakistan because both countries possess
nuclear weapons. Finally, Fair argues that the Pakistani military is inspired to take further risks
because they have nuclear weapons, raising the possibility that nuclear weapons, contrary to the
MAD (mutually assured destruction) policy, actually increase the likelihood of a war between
India and Pakistan.78
How, then, could the dilemma have been alternatively resolved? The problems that
Shultz cites in his memo to Reagan are valid. The Reagan administration had made the war
between the mujahideen and the Soviet Union a priority after they had hammered Carter for
letting the Soviets invade in 1979. It was not a realistic political proposition to expect the Reagan
administration to throw it overboard for the Pakistani government’s nuclear program. However,
it is possible that neither a nuclear weapon free Pakistan or a neutral Afghanistan had to be
sacrificed to achieve both goals. The Reagan administration could have engaged in talks with the
Soviet Union, India and Pakistan in order to achieve an arms reduction treaty that would curtail
the threat of nuclear war on the Indian subcontinent. Such an idea was mentioned by Shultz at
various times between 1983-9, but it seems to have gained little traction among the other
members of the Reagan administration. This happened because the ascendant moderates within
the administration were too cowed by Zia to pull off a successful peace deal with the Soviets.
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Zia killed off the idea before it could take shape and the Reagan administration chose not
to push the issue out of fear for the mujahideen aid program. Zia by that point had built up so
much support within the Reagan administration that even the moderate faction composed of
Shultz and Chief of Staff Howard Baker were too afraid of Zia to approach the Soviets. It
certainly was not out a general dislike of the Soviets when one considers how much they were
willing to negotiate with Gorbachev over nuclear nonproliferation. However, this fear may have
been misguided, as the Pakistani military did show that it was willing to make certain sacrifices
(the delay in nuclear testing, for example) for the sake of the Afghan aid. Regardless, it was a
missed opportunity when one considers how much Reagan and Gorbachev were able to achieve
in nuclear arms reduction in the late 1980s. While it cannot be proven that a coalition
government in Afghanistan would have prevented the civil war that would follow the Soviet
withdrawal, it at least would have made war less likely.79
When Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985 he was determined to
implement a radical shift in Soviet foreign policy. He had replaced then Foreign Minister
Gromyko, a major player in US-Soviet relations for over two decades, with a close political ally,
a Georgian reformer named Eduard Shevernadze, however, Gromyko still got a seat on the
Soviet Politburo in order appease the Soviet hardliners.80 Gorbachev considered his policies of
Perestroika and Glasnost not as mere domestic policy reforms, but as new mentalities indicative
of a shift in Soviet thinking in foreign policy as well. He was determined to seek a new
understanding with the United States, as he believed that peace abroad would mean that more
resources could be spent at home in the USSR.81
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Chief among these new priorities was an end to Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. An
accidental war to begin with, the Afghan War had grown more and more unpopular as casualties
mounted, costs spiraled, and the USSR became bogged down in a conflict it was increasingly
clear that it could not win. Having watched as his predecessors blundered into the war practically
by mistake (Soviet forces had originally entered Afghanistan to replace a President that they felt
was insufficiently loyal) Gorbachev now wanted to end the war in Afghanistan as swiftly as
possible. But Reagan, Casey, and Zia were all determined to inflict the biggest possible
humiliation on the Soviet Union. Reagan and Casey wanted to do this for propaganda purposes.
Zia’s motivation lay in increasing his power in Afghanistan through his puppets in the
mujahideen.82
Before Gorbachev took power in 1985, there was less appetite for a truce on the part of
the Soviet leadership. Hardliners, chief among them the former foreign minister Anatoly
Gromyko, wanted a military victory from the Soviet army as it had delivered in 1957 in
Budapest, Hungary, and in 1968 in Prague, in the Czech Republic. Gromyko and the other
hardliners would insist on an end to the Pakistani government’s aid to the mujahideen, which
both sides knew was really a demand that the US stop its covert operation. Considering how
important the aid to the mujahideen was to the Reagan administration, Gromyko must have
known that this would be a non-starter. This changed when Gorbachev ousted Gromyko with
Shevernadze83

82
Milt Beardon, James Risen, The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA’s Final Showdown with the
KGB (New York: Random House, 2003) Kindle Ed. Loc 3159, Ahmed Rashid, Taliban, Militant Islam, Oil, and
Central Asia (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 2nd ed, 2010) 183
83
Gorbachev, Memoirs, 231, 1/22/87, Minutes from a Meeting of the Politburo, Woodrow Wilson Center,
Cold War International History Project, Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan Collection.

33

The Reagan administration was almost as militaristic as the Soviets when it came to
Afghanistan. Although they did put out statements saying that they were open to negotiations
with the Soviets, the Politburo doubted their sincerity and Gorbachev himself would later state
that it was “in their (the Reagan administration’s) best interests” to bleed the Soviet army during
the war. CIA Islamabad Station Chief Milt Beardon stated as much when he wrote that the
objective was “harassing’ the Soviets.”84
Beardon and his colleagues at the CIA were doing more than simply “harassing” the
USSR, however. They were causing the moral and psychological underpinnings of Soviet society
to come apart. Just as the Tsar had once used the Russian army against peasants, now Soviet
citizens saw their government do the exact same thing in Afghanistan. As Soviet reporter
Artyom Borovik would later write…
In Afghanistan, we bombed not only the detachments of rebels and their caravans, but our own ideals as
well. With the war came the reevaluation of our moral and ethical values. In Afghanistan, the policies of
the government became utterly incompatible with the inherent morality of our nation. Things could not
continue in the same vein. It is hardly coincidental that the ideas of Perestroika took hold in 1985, the year
the war reached its peak.85

The war produced further changes in the Soviet psyche. The horrors of the war led many
soldiers to turn to religion despite the fact that religion had been shunned in the USSR for so
long. At a time when the Soviet Union was going through immense economic upheaval, many
Soviet citizens wondered how their government could be spending so much on the war in
Afghanistan when their own economy lagged at home? All of these factors created discontent in
the Russian public.86
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In addition, the war in Afghanistan led the Soviet high command to rethink their military
strategy in other parts of the globe. When the Solidarity movement gained strength in Poland and
the other Warsaw Pact countries looked ready to split from the Eastern Bloc, Soviet commanders
were reluctant to send troops the way they had to the Czech Republic in 1968 and to Hungary in
1956 because they feared that the Afghan debacle might be repeated in Eastern Europe. In short,
the war in Afghanistan destroyed Soviet confidence in their own military forces (which was
remarkable given how fierce they appeared to be in the late 1970s). The fall of the Soviet army
would have an important role in the collapse of the USSR as a whole. This is important to
measure the effectiveness of the Reagan administration’s policies87
The war in Afghanistan quickened the end of the Soviet public’s faith in the communist
system. Borovik writes that Soviet defectors wrote that they “had no faith” in Gorbachev’s
reforms of Glasnost and Perestroika because they were violating those very principles on the
fields of Afghanistan. Additionally, they voiced concerns that Gorbachev would not last long
enough in power to see through these reforms. They saw not only the individuals that had started
the Afghan conflict, but “the system” behind it as well.88 They saw that Afghanistan defied
reform, and considered it as emblematic of the worst flaws of the Soviet system. As one Soviet
defector stated “there is little Glasnost in Afghanistan.89
The disillusion with war (and the concurrent economic crisis) was not a phenomenon that
limited itself to the Soviet Union. The United States had gone through a similar process a decade
earlier. The Vietnam War and the economic crisis of the 1970s had created a similar political
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situation as was taking place in the USSR. What differed between the two countries was their
political systems. Democracy gave the United States public a means to change policies in order
to ease their anxieties—although whether or not the economic solutions the Reagan
administration implemented actually worked continues to be a matter of debate. The USSR did
not have this kind of flexibility. Instead, Soviet citizens saw Gorbachev as a fig leaf for the
hardliners to continue operating the “system” as they always had. Afghanistan was only one part
of all this. Broader economic trends, combined with political rigidity that resulted from an
autocratic system, were responsible for the fall of the Soviet Union. However, defenders of US
covert warfare can say that the Afghan war most likely averted a war in Eastern Europe over the
Warsaw Pact, and that it contributed to the collapse of Soviet morale.90
So, what went wrong in Afghanistan? Was it as simple as Charlie Wilson’s statement that
the US “fucked up the endgame?”91 The answer is both yes and no. The Reagan administration
and the CIA made crucial mistakes both during and at the end of the Afghan war that allowed the
situation in Afghanistan to spiral out of control. Then CIA Station Chief in Islamabad, Milt
Beardon, admitted as much when he said the needs of the Afghan people were not a priority for
the United States. Because the Soviets, Americans, and Pakistanis treated Afghanistan and the
Afghan people as no more than a mere pawn in the Great Game, they turned a blind eye to the
needs of the people on whose land they were fighting. Doing so would have bad consequences
for all the countries involved.92
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The Reagan administration missed crucial opportunities to negotiate with the Soviet
Union to resolve the Afghan crisis. By trying to force a coalition government that was not really
a coalition government at all, but really an alliance of the mujahideen groups, the Reagan
administration sowed instability in a country that had already been torn apart by civil war. By
1985, when Gorbachev took power and the Soviets were ready to negotiate, the damage to the
Soviet army had already been done. The very reason that Gorbachev was so eager to withdraw
from Afghanistan was because he knew the damage that it was doing to the Soviet army. But the
State Department and the CIA remained enthralled by Zia, who insisted that no negotiations that
involved a coalition government take place. In addition, public opinion on the Afghan conflict
had shifted.93
Congressman Charlie Wilson had successfully pushed to raise the budget for the
mujahideen, and had also made efforts to enlist third country support for the mujahideen. The
bulk of this new funding went towards providing the mujahideen with “stinger” anti-aircraft
missiles. These missiles were intended to shoot down Soviet HIND helicopters, and they
accomplished that goal with great success. But they also created a political environment in both
the United States and Afghanistan that caused the US government to view the complete victory
of the mujahideen as the necessary end of the Afghan conflict.94
Both Congressman Wilson and the CIA also obtained the support of the Saudi Arabian
monarchy. Although the Saudis provided a huge amount of money to the Afghan cause, this
money was only necessary if the objective was to drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan entirely,
and not to simply pressure the USSR into negotiating. Meanwhile, Saudi money funded the most
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fundamentalist elements of the mujahideen and Arab fighters came to their aid. Among the most
prominent of these fighters was the son of a Saudi construction millionaire named Osama bin
Laden. Bin Laden would become the “middleman” that the Saudi monarchy used to funnel
money between them and the mujahideen.95 If the Arab fighters were truly necessary, plans for
their demobilization and disarmament could have been part of a plan to end the conflict and
establish a coalition government in Afghanistan. Worst of all, the United States appears to have
been almost completely ignorant of the potential harm that these individuals could do to the
United States. Aside from one memo that described a “hostility” towards the United States, the
issue of terrorism was scarcely mentioned in the administration’s discussions of Afghanistan.96
In the case of the Reagan administration’s aid to the Pakistani government, we see the
danger in becoming too reliant on foreign dictators who act according to their interests, not those
of the United States. Zia’s policies wound up causing the rise of the Taliban in the decade after
the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan. However, at least there was a Soviet retreat. The Reagan
administration’s aid to Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega, on the other hand, would not only
see long term disaster, but a short term failure as well.97
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In 1986, Reagan gave a speech addressing drug addiction. Calling drug smugglers
“threats to national security,” he told the American people that he would undertake new
“international efforts with our partners” to root out drug trafficking.98 In the same speech, the
First Lady, Nancy Reagan, would famously make her “just say no” commandment that would
define American drug policy for a generation. The United States government, under Democratic
and Republican presidents, would pursue a war on drugs with “with the help of our allies.”99 This
could be understood as a reference to Noriega, among others.
But some of those same “partners” that were helping to advance US policy in some areas
were actually undermining counternarcotic forces. Perhaps the most infamous example was the
Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega, who organized a drug smuggling network through Central
America while simultaneously aiding the Reagan administration’s support of the Contra war in
Nicaragua. Noriega even had contacts in the Contras who helped him smuggle drugs.
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Contra commander Eden Pastora would send his pilots to the airbase in Costa Rica to
pick up Noriega’s cargo, then Pastora’s pilots would fly to Miami with the drugs. In Miami,
Pastora’s agents would sell the drugs to a local drug chief named George (AKA Jorge) Morales.
The CIA eventually discovered Pastora’s ties to Morales in 1985. Pastora’s drug smuggling
contributed to the CIA’s decision to end American aid to Pastora’s group. However, the Reagan
administration did not end their aid to Noriega. Instead, Reagan’s manager of the Contra War,
Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, continued negotiating with the Panamanian dictator, asking for
his help in rebuilding the Contra southern front. The new southern front was also filled with drug
traffickers, however, as North’s courier Robert Owen admitted to North at the time. Noriega’s
illegal activities would not end until the US invasion of Panama in 1989. Like everything else
about the American relationship with Noriega, the invasion was messy, careless, and reckless.
The damage had been done, however. Noriega had helped to establish a major smuggling route
that continues to this day.100
For all that, Noriega’s aid to the southern front Contras was useless, and a poor strategic
choice by the Reagan administration. He provided Pastora’s southern front with the supplies and
money it needed to fight the Sandinistas, but Pastora and his men were not efficient fighters. The
Reagan administration’s decision to aid Noriega was a huge mistake that, far from being a
sacrifice made for the good of the Contras, actually hindered the Contra war effort. This failure
of the southern front Contras is important to note because it means that not only did the actions
of the Reagan administration help create a thriving drug trade in Central and South America, but
did not even accomplish its intended purpose of helping the Contras.101
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In this section, I will analyze Reagan administration aid to the Noriega dictatorship in
Panama. Many of these sources have come to light as a result of the investigations into the IranContra Affair, and thus there is more material available for this subject than there might be for
another. The CIA’s accounts of Contra drug trafficking, obtained from the CIA archives, have
proven to be very useful. I use the CIA’s account of the affair primarily because an examination of the
full story of the CIA’s involvement in drug trafficking is beyond the scope of this paper. Should the
reader be concerned that I am too reliant on the CIA’s version of events, I remind them that I have
included the Kerry report. Obtained from the NSA Archive and headed by a Democratic senator (John
Kerry) who is unlikely to let the CIA off easy. I refrain from using Gary Webb’s famous (or infamous?)
book Dark Alliance primarily because of the unproven status of some of the book’s claims regarding the
full extent of CIA involvement in the drug trade. However, I must admit that I owe a debt to Webb for
igniting the debate on Contra drug trafficking. Numerous newspaper articles, mainly from The New York
Times and The Washington Post, have also proven helpful in piecing together Contra drug smuggling
routes. Frederick Kempe’s book Divorcing the Dictator contains many interviews with Noriega’s
associates that I am unable to reproduce on my own. The website “The Reagan Files,” built around the
source material for a book of a similar name, has helped with its collection of administration meetings. In
this section, I conclude that Reagan administration aid to Noriega led to a failed experiment of another
front for the Contras, while all the while Noriega used the opportunity to smuggle more drugs into the
United States.102

Meanwhile, Reagan’s desire to remove the Sandinistas from power had become “an
obsession” for him. He became determined to drive out the Sandinistas by any means necessary.
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Those means included enlisting the support of other countries, even if such support violated US
law prohibiting the White House from doing so. At a NSPG meeting in June 25th, 1984, Reagan
and his NSPG discussed doing exactly that. The NSPG became divided along the two factional
lines between Secretary of State George Shultz and CIA director Bill Casey. The Shultz faction
that was composed of State Department officials opposed the idea, fearing that it may be illegal
and instead favoring continued negotiations with the Sandinistas. The Casey faction, joined in
this particular meeting by Vice President George H.W. Bush, stated that the idea was legal, and
that the Contras would never negotiate in good faith. Bush even went so far as to state “how can
anyone object to encouraging third parties to provide help to the anti-Sandinistas?”103 President
Reagan appeared to waver, saying that he would delay the decision until Attorney General
Edwin Meese determined whether such support was legal. However, Reagan would also state
that if the subject of the meeting leaked “we’ll all be hanging by our thumbs in front of the White
House until we find out who did it.”104
The opening of the “Southern Front” was a direct contributing factor to the
administration’s decision to violate American law. The “Southern Front” stretched already
incredibly limited funds for the Contras still further, weakening Contra resupply efforts and
pushing Casey and others to consider violating American law. It is hard to say whether or not the
infamous visit to Iran would have happened had it not been for Casey’s insistence on a second
front against the Sandinistas.105
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It is not known whether Meese actually ever made a decision on the matter. However, we
do know that Reagan authorized Casey to find support for the Contras wherever he could.
Reagan stated that “it was better unmentioned” which countries were aiding the Reagan
administration’s Contra program.106 Such ignorance allowed Reagan to claim deniability about
the administration’s dealings with Noriega and the Iran-Contra scandal, but it left a massive
amount of power in the hands of Casey and his allies, and gave them an incredible amount of
autonomy in shaping US foreign policy. These decisions, made in secret and without the
knowledge of either President Reagan or the United States Congress, made the CIA director and
his allies accountable to virtually no one and allowed him to make huge mistakes that would
reverberate through US policy for decades.107
Those mistakes included an alliance with one of the most infamous drug smuggler in
history. Casey was eager to open a second front in the Contra war. Specifically, he wanted to
create a Contra force that would operate out of Costa Rica and launch attacks into Nicaragua,
similar to what the “Northern Front” Contras were already doing along the Honduras-Nicaragua
border. To fund and train those Contras, he needed another country close to Nicaragua to do the
details. Costa Rica would not work, since it had abolished its army after a 1948 revolution.
Noriega’s Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) on the other hand, were both well trained and (at
least ostensibly) friendly to the United States. Panama would become a base for the “Southern
Front” Contras, providing them with training camps and guns that Noriega’s soldiers would
smuggle into Costa Rica to help the Contras.108
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To run this new Contra force, Casey turned to a former Sandinista named Eden Pastora.
A native to southern Nicaragua, he had joined the Sandinista Revolution and made headlines,
even becoming “the most famous Sandinista in the world,” according to author Kenneth E.
Morris, after tearing off his ski mask during a raid on the presidential palace. Pastora craved
fame, money, and power, defecting to the Contras after the revolution because he felt that the
Sandinistas had not given him enough power. (Soon enough, however, Pastora would become a
headache for the CIA because of his insubordination to the CIA directors of the Contra War and
drug trafficking).109
At first the Reagan administration was highly optimistic about Pastora. A 1983 CIA
assessment of Pastora stated that he was “adroit” and that he was “clever and articulate.”110 The
Reagan administration believed that Pastora would have additional propaganda power due to his
earlier ties to the Sandinistas and the revolution. However, they did not take into account
Pastora’s motives for leaving the Sandinistas. Anyone who studied Pastora’s actions during the
Sandinista revolution would see that Pastora was motivated solely by personal gain. Pastora had
taken any opportunity that he saw to make his name famous in the headlines of international
newspapers (such as when he tore off his ski mask during a Sandinista raid, making him the most
famous Sandinista in the world) and to make money off the nascent international drug trade. This
ambition made him easy to turn against the Sandinistas, but it would also make him harder for
the Reagan administration to control. Ambition would lead Pastora to commit insubordination
towards the CIA managers of the Contra program, as he refused to unite with the “northern
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front.” Eventually, it would turn the former Sandinista into a puppet of Manuel Noriega and
Colombian drug kingpin Pablo Escobar.111
The gun and drug smuggling routes through Central America were not new to either
Pastora or Noriega. During the Sandinista revolution, Noriega’s predecessor, Omar Torrijos, had
sent supplies to Pastora, who was then fighting against Somoza, using the same routes. Now
Noriega used those same routes with the help of the CIA. While the CIA sent guns and built
airstrips that Noriega used for the Contra program, Noriega used the aid to support his drug
smuggling. Noriega sent pilots flying airplanes laden with drugs and guns to an airstrip in Costa
Rica near the Nicaraguan border owned by an American expatriate and CIA asset John Hull.
Once the guns had been offloaded and given to the Contras, the planes then flew on to the United
States carrying the drugs. Noriega’s drug ring went as far as to recruit American expatriate and
CIA asset John Hull as a member of the trafficking network.112 Hull, who had arrived in northern
Costa Rica from Indiana, had been recruited to the CIA by the CIA Station Chief in Costa Rica,
Joe Fernandez. However, Hull owned the property where these planes landed in Costa Rica, and
took part in the smuggling of drugs through the area. After the drugs arrived in Miami, Florida,
Pastora and his fellow Contras had made sure that they were sold to a Miami drug kingpin
named Jorge (AKA George) Morales.113
Of course, the Reagan administration denied that they had anything to do with Noriega.
When Vice President Bush ran for president in the 1988 election, his Democratic opponent,
Governor Michael Dukakis, accused Bush of being in league with Noriega, who by then had
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been indicted by a US court. When Bush denied Dukakis’ allegation, the Washington Post
released a photograph that showed Bush sitting next to Noriega during a 1982 trip to Panama.
Despite this revelation, Bush would win the election in a landslide. Oliver North would also state
in his memoirs that “we did nothing with Noriega.”114 Of course, nothing could be further from
the truth. Other problems would soon emerge with the southern front Contras.
Eventually the CIA grew tired of Pastora’s stubborn refusal to ally his forces with the
Contra forces operating out of Honduras. Pastora saw these Contras as the old friends of
Somoza’s that they were, and knew that joining with them would undermine his brand as a
former Sandinista. The CIA would cut off all aid to Pastora’s forces in 1984. The fact that he was
a former Sandinista also caused the Sandinista leadership to view him with alarm. On May 30th,
1984, a bomb exploded at Pastora’s press conference. Pastora and number of his senior aides, as
well as several European and American reporters, were injured. One American, a reporter of the
Tico Times, a newspaper serving the American expatriate community in Costa Rica, died in the
blast.115
For all that trouble, Eden Pastora’s army was not particularly formidable. One of
Noriega’s intelligence aides, Jose Blandon, stated that Pastora’s fighters were “café guerrillas”
who fought for a short amount of time before drinking the rest of the day away.116 A New York
Times report also stated that Pastora’s Contras had lost major battles to the Sandinistas, losing
many soldiers, and having to retreat from a large amount of territory. North and Poindexter tried
to form another Contra army under the command of Fernando Jose Chamorro, a cousin of future
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Nicaraguan President Violeta Chamorro, but they did not fare much better, with Blandon saying
that they were not much better than Pastora’s army. In addition, several of the fighters around
Chamorro were drug smugglers, including one named Sebastian Gonzalez, who North’s agent in
Nicaragua, Robert Owen, stated was “involved in drug running out of Panama.”117 The CIA
would later state that Gonzalez was working for Noriega.118
Noriega also undermined the Reagan administration’s anti-communist strategy in Central
America. Noriega sold arms to the Salvadorian Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front
(FMLN). In theory, the arms sales should have made him just as much of a US enemy as the
Sandinistas, as the main complaint the Reagan administration had with the Sandinistas was that
they were supplying the leftist guerrillas in El Salvador. In practice, the Reagan administration
turned a blind eye to Noriega’s dealings while the State Department referred to him as the “renta-colonel.”119 Noriega’s dealings with Fidel Castro were even more complicated. The arms sales
show that Noriega was actively undermining US foreign policy goals and that he was causing
just as much of a problem to the US as the Sandinistas, making any pressure he exerted on the
Sandinistas negligible.
Noriega’s relationship with Castro had begun when Noriega was Torrijos’ head of
intelligence. After Noriega came into power, he supplied arms to the Cuban backed leftist July
19th Movement (M-19) rebels in Colombia. These rebels also collaborated with the Medellin
Cartel, another one of Noriega’s clients.120 M-19, in collaboration with the Medellin Cartel,
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Noriega, and Castro, shipped drugs to the United States via Cuba and Panama. Noriega also
shipped American goods to Cuba in violation of the economic embargo that the United States
had placed on Cuba in 1962.121
Together with Fidel Castro, Bahamian Prime Minister Lynden Pindling, and Pablo
Escobar, Noriega was a crucial link in the chain that formed the Cartel’s route to the United
States. The first link to appear was in the Bahamas, where the Medellin Cartel, specifically one
of its more notorious smugglers named Carlos Lehder, bought one of the archipelago’s many
islands to use as a drug shipment point. From there, the Cartel gained the cooperation of Fidel
Castro and the Cuban government, which sent guns to M-19 and armed many of the Cartel’s
smugglers and assassins. The Cuban government also provided the Cartel with refueling stations
in Cuba for the Cartel’s airplanes. When the United States started to demand that the Bahamian
government crack down on the drug smugglers, the Cartel desperately tried to find an alternate
route. According to Lehder, they turned to Noriega, who proceeded to launch a drug smuggling
scheme that used Contra aid as a cover for his drug operations.122
Noriega even sheltered the top members of the Medellin Cartel. The rising prominence of
the drug cartels also brought them increasing political scrutiny on the part of the Colombian
government, and Colombian Attorney General Rodrigo Lara-Bonilla launched an investigation
into drug trafficking. The Medellin Cartel had Lara-Bonilla assassinated. The assassination
resulted in the Colombian government putting more resources than ever before into destroying
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the Cartel. Escobar and his associates were forced to flee to Panama, where Noriega gave them
shelter until they could return to Colombia. Noriega also allowed the Cartel to build a large drug
processing plant along the Colombian border. When increasing scrutiny from the US forced
Noriega to shut down the plant, Escobar threatened Noriega’s life. It was only through a deal
brokered by Fidel Castro that Noriega was able to regain Escobar’s favor.123
Although Noriega made a substantial contribution to the ability of the Medellin Cartel to
smuggle drugs into the United States (especially if one regards the statements made by Lehder as
truth) Noriega’s activities in money laundering were ultimately more important to the Cartel
overall. Noriega’s role in stashing Cartel drug profits was so large that prosecutor Leon B.
Kellner, stated that Noriega “turned Panamanian banks into money laundering centers,” and that
he “provided invaluable assistance to the Cartel.”124 The Kerry report goes into further detail,
describing how Noriega made drug money disappear into Panamanian banks. According to the
Kerry report, the money would go to the National Bank of Panama before it reappeared in
Colombia in the hands of the Medellin Cartel, who invested it into various properties and
franchises in that country. Panama’s status as a prime area of tax evasion continues into the
present day, most notably with the “Panama Papers” scandal, which forced Pakistani Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif to resign. It is important to mention this because it points out how much
Noriega, who the US supported, helped the narcotic industry take shape.125
Noriega did most of his money laundering in collaboration with a Cuban-American drug
smuggler named Ramon Milian-Rodriguez. Rodriguez was described by the New York Times as
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the Cartel’s point man on money laundering. Rodriguez testified before a US court that he paid
between 320 to 350 million dollars to Noriega over the course of Noriega’s time in office.
Rodriguez estimated that the amount of money that went through Panamanian banks on its way
to Colombia was around eleven billion dollars. While most accounts of Noriega and the Medellin
Cartel minimize Noriega’s contribution to the Cartel, this information proves that Noriega was in
fact a highly important piece of the narcotics trade in the 1980s. Just because he did not smuggle
the drugs himself does not mean that he did not have an important role in the organization’s
strategy.126
While the importance of Noriega’s contribution to the rise of the Medellin Cartel should
not be underestimated, it is important to bear in mind that Noriega and Panama were important to
the drug trade. While it is certainly true that the Cartel was handling 80-90% of the international
cocaine trade by the mid 1980s, and that Noriega was laundering most of the Cartel’s money in
Panamanian banks, one should keep in mind that the drug trade can not be reduced to a single
dictator, or even a single drug cartel. When the Colombian army killed Pablo Escobar and
dismantled the Medellin Cartel in 1991, another cartel, based in the neighboring city of Cali,
took its place. Milian-Rodriguez also claimed that if the United States shut down Panama’s
money laundering banking sector, he “would have transferred our assets to Curacao (an Dutchadministered island in the Caribbean) overnight” before he began the search for a new country
through which to launder money.127 At the most basic level, the drug trade was an industry that
moved itself, independently of the fates of individuals like Escobar or Noriega. However, it also
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meant that the Reagan administration’s emphasis on drug law enforcement was ultimately
fundamentally misguided.128
When Reagan gave his “address to the nation” on September 14th, 1986, he confidently
cited numbers of how many drug traders had been arrested. But, as we have seen, any attempt to
curtail the drugs trade through force is futile. No amount of Drug Enforcement Administration)
(DEA) raids can drive the profit out of the narcotics industry. As long as there is some
dictatorship or other corrupt government willing to deal in drugs, and as long as there are other
individuals who can make a profit in other parts of the trade, it will continue. Treatment, then,
combined with a regional effort to raise income levels so that growing coca is not as profitable
(so as to at least decrease the supply) is the only politically feasible solution. Legalization could
also be part of the solution, but in today’s political climate, where even the legalization of
cannabis, never mind cocaine and heroin, is controversial, I do not believe there is the political
will for carry it through Congress.129
Just as Zia had financed the Pakistani nuclear program with funds laundered through the
Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), Noriega would use the same bank to
launder money for the Medellin Cartel. Noriega and the Cartel both used BCCI to launder drug
money. In addition to using BCCI to fund the Cartel, Noriega would use the bank for his own
money as well, eventually holding millions of dollars in BCCI accounts. The CIA would also use
BCCI for its own purposes, and Oliver North used it to funnel money to the Contras. These
crimes would eventually cause BCCI to be investigated by the United States. This in turn would
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lead to a trial for BCCI and its employees in Tampa, Florida, where many of the allegations
about the bank would come to light. Noriega too was about to have a dramatic reversal.130
Vice President Bush looked certain to be the Republican Party’s heir apparent to the
“Reagan Revolution” in the 1988 presidential election. However, his past dealings with Noriega
were beginning to come to light. Still an active participant in the Reagan administration’s NSPG
meetings, which were becoming more and more focused on Noriega’s shenanigans, Bush pushed
hard for an invasion of Panama to oust Noriega. Reagan himself was torn between wanting to see
Noriega punished and not wanting to commit American troops to another intervention akin to the
one that had seen American marines blown up in their Beirut barracks. Bush’s Democratic Party
opponent, Michael Dukakis, used Bush’s ties with Noriega to attack the Vice President’s
campaign. At first, Bush denied ever meeting with Noriega. Then, when the photograph of him
sitting with Noriega in Panama emerged in the Washington Post, he stated that he did not learn
about Noriega’s drug trafficking until 1987. “Reagan administration officials” denied this,
however, saying that he had learned of Noriega’s activities in 1985. Bush would soon move to
remove Noriega once and for all131
After Bush won the 1988 election, he was determined to rid himself of his Noriega
related baggage. Bush would launch “Operation Just Cause” in December 1989, an invasion of
Panama that would succeed in its goal of ousting Noriega. Although it was able to create a
democratic regime in Panama under the leadership of Guillermo Endara, it also resulted in a
large number of civilian casualties. A report from the organization “Human Rights Watch”
would state that despite the fact that the Panamanian government and the US disputed the
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number of civilian casualties, which were estimated to range from several hundred to several
thousand, the number of casualties “suggest that the rule of proportionality and the duty to
minimize harm to civilians” was not followed during the invasion. Bush’s desire to help himself
politically by getting rid of Noriega outweighed his concern for the United States’ standing in
Panama, Latin America and around the world. The US’ relationship with Noriega was a
catastrophe from beginning to end.132

Zaire.

By 1986, Zairian dictator Mobutu Sese Seko’s regime was in shambles. Systematic
corruption and the theft of the country’s resources by Mobutu and his friends had bankrupted
Zaire, destroyed the nation’s standard of living, and infuriated the Zairian people. Although the
Mobutu dictatorship was a prominent ally of the United States in its efforts to prevent the spread
of leftism across Eastern and Southern Africa, even the CIA admitted that the days of the
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Mobutu regime were numbered.133 However, the Reagan administration believed that the
Mobutu dictatorship, however corrupt it was, was preferable to a leftist regime, particularly one
that they feared was friendly to the man that was one of the staunchest enemies of the Reagan
administration.”134
Libyan dictator Muammar al-Gaddafi had become the prime external enemy of Mobutu
during the 1980s. After Gaddafi invaded the Chadian territory of the Aozou Strip in 1978,
Mobutu sent support to the Chadian government. He had most likely done this to keep the
Reagan Administration happy, after all, they had just coordinated an intervention by European
and Moroccan troops to repel an incursion of Zairian rebels entering the country from Angola.
Mobutu’s help led Gaddafi to retaliate, giving aid to another Zairian rebel group along the border
with Tanzania with the assistance of the Tanzanian government. The Reagan administration
feared that this newly empowered group of rebels could assassinate Mobutu. While Reagan and
his allies were not worried about a leftist government rising to power in the Zairian capital
Kinshasa, they were concerned that border provinces, particularly the province of Shaba
(Katanga) along the border with Angola, and Kivu, along the border with Tanzania, could fall
under leftist influence.135
Because the United States used military aid to try to keep the Congo friendly to its
interests, a series of US presidents of both parties, from Nixon through Ford and Carter on to
Reagan, were willing to overlook Mobutu’s growing relationship with the People’s Republic of
China (PRC). Indeed, there were even times that Nixon’s National Security Adviser and later
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Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, remarked that Mobutu could serve as bridge between and
the US and the 1970s leadership of China, and that the Chinese government’s influence in Africa
could counter Soviet power on that continent.136
I am not suggesting more “hawkish” policies towards the PRC. I am suggesting,
however, that we should keep the PRC in mind just as we would with any other power of its size.
I agree with Chen Jian’s thesis of engaging with China through negotiation, remembering
China’s history of trauma inflicted upon it at the hands of imperialist powers. I feel it important
to mention this in the body of this paper because to do otherwise would be to risk peddling the
same type of aggressive policies that I accuse Casey and others of doing.137
However, there were strains in the US-Mobutu relationship. Mobutu even expelled the
American ambassador to Zaire in 1975 because he believed the United States to be behind an
attempt to oust him from power. Much of this tension stemmed from Mobutu’s decision to move
closer to Maoist China in the 1970s and 1980s. US policy towards Mobutu in the 1970s appears
to have been inconsistent, as Nixon, Ford, and Carter at times supported Mobutu while at other
times criticized him for his alliance with the leadership in China during the 1970s and 1980s or
the human rights abuses his regime committed.138
In this section, I will analyze American aid to Mobutu during the Reagan administration.
Sources on Cold War Zairian history are hard to find even for more distant periods such as the
Nixon administration. For someone studying the Reagan administration’s policy towards Zaire, it
is that much more so. However, the CIA archives have proven to be highly useful on this subject,
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providing me with many CIA memorandums I would not otherwise have. State Department
archives have also proved useful in researching the Tanzania portions of this section. Finally, the
National Security Archive, particularly the “unredacted” blog, have been most helpful in
researching the Reagan administration’s policy towards Libya. In this section, I will argue that a
failure by the Reagan administration to negotiate with Zaire’s neighbors led to the fall of the
Mobutu regime, two bloody wars in central Africa, and rising Chinese government influence in
the region. Specifically, by abandoning any thought of dialogue with Tanzanian leader Julius
Nyerere, the Reagan administration gave up on any hope for a negotiated settlement in the
region.139
By the 1980s, most American intelligence analysts knew that the government of Mobutu
Sese Seko in Zaire was destined to fall. Policymakers tried to reign in Mobutu’s huge budget
deficit by imposing austerity upon the country. However, this did little to curb Mobutu’s greed,
which was the real cause of Zaire’s fiscal problems. The Reagan administration believed that
Mobutu was the only person who could hold Zaire together in the face of the Libyan and
Tanzanian subversion they feared. The Reagan administration’s fixation on Gaddafi obliterated
any thought of other considerations that were a part of the US-Zaire relationship. By far the
largest among these was Mobutu’s closeness with the then leadership of the People’s Republic of
China, which the Reagan administration barely seemed to notice. Chinese government leadership
in the 1970s and 1980s would use the Soviet-American rivalry in Central Africa to expand their
own power in the region. Thirty years later, the amount of power they acquired would cause
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great alarm in the United States. Had the United States sought a negotiated solution with
Tanzania and other members of the “frontline” states, this may have been prevented.140
Contrary to what is often believed, the Reagan administration primarily did not aid
Mobutu to help the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in the
Angolan civil war. Actually, South Africa was the administration’s major ally in the Angolan
struggle.141 Instead, the Reagan administration’s motivation in aiding the Zairian dictator had
more to do with a struggle farther to the north. At the time, Libyan leader Muammar Al Gaddafi
was engaged in a geopolitical and diplomatic struggle with Egypt and its leader, Anwar Al Sadat
(and later Hosni Mubarak.). In his bid to obtain political supremacy in North Africa, Gaddafi
invaded neighboring Chad to the south. Eager to showcase his willingness to act as a US ally,
Mobutu sent troops to aid the Chadian government. Gaddafi retaliated by funding Zairian rebels.
Additionally, Mobutu and Gaddafi were on different sides of the political questions that gripped
post-colonial Africa.142
The “Front for the Liberation of the Congo” (FLNC) had been fighting Mobutu for a
generation by the 1980s. They based themselves first in Angola, where they launched an
incursion into the southern province of Katanga in 1977. The Angolan government was more
than eager to help the FLNC attack an opponent who was shipping supplies to their rightist
UNITA adversaries. The rebels advanced into Zairian territory, routing Mobutu’s forces.
Panicked, Mobutu asked his European and American allies for help. France and Belgium
obliged, sending in troops to force the FLNC back to Angola. While Mobutu’s regime had been
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saved for the moment, it was now clear just how precarious his situation was. Mobutu could no
longer hold Zaire together by himself. He would need help from outside in order to maintain his
rule.143
After the 1977 invasion of Katanga, the Angolan faction of the FLNC faded. It was
replaced by a new faction set up in the “Great Lakes” region,” which referred to the area around
Lake Tanganyika. This faction was not supplied by the Angolans, but by the governments of
Tanzania to the east and Libya to the north. They were also receiving funding indirectly from
Maoist China via Tanzanian and Libyan intermediaries. Although the Chinese government had
not funded the FLNC directly since the 1960s, in practice, they still contributed to the FLNC by
funding the Tanzanian and Libyan armies, who, in turn, supported the FLNC. This support is
particularly noteworthy because the Chinese government also provided aid to Mobutu’s army,
thus giving them leverage in both sides of the conflict.144 While this part of the FLNC was quite
small (numbering no more than a couple hundred of fighters), American intelligence analysts
feared it could tip an already unstable political and economic situation into a full blown crisis
through a hypothetical assassination of Mobutu or another 1977 style incursion. This event could
then lead to the Angolans renewing their assistance to the FLNC, along with a resurgence is local
separatist movements. After Mobutu fell in 1996, the Congo would splinter in a fashion similar
to what the CIA had predicted. The key to preventing this lay through a negotiated solution with
Tanzania.145 US officials had tried to impose a Westphalian concept of nationalism upon the
Congo, and it ended in failure. Mobutu had tried to oblige them by forcefully controlling the
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territory with an iron grip and by trying to indoctrinate the “Zairian” people into a culture of
“authenticite” that emphasized a black African identity, but this had fallen apart after Mobutu’s
overthrow. In Central Africa, and Africa more broadly, rulers had not had the type of control
over territory that the Westphalian model required. This dynamic had changed in the post
independence period, as even revolutionary regimes tried to structure themselves around a strong
central government necessary to keep the different ethnic groups united under colonialism
together.146 This in turn led to authoritarianism as these governments resorted to harsher and
harsher methods to keep rebellious minorities in check. Together with African leaders, many of
whom sincerely believed it was the right path for their countries, the superpowers imposed a
version of the Westphalian governmental structure completely alien to the continent.147
But after the Cold War ended in 1989, Mobutu became less of a priority to American
geopolitical strategists. Zaire drifted out of the United States’ focus, and Mobutu had made many
enemies who now saw a chance to remove him. When Mobutu sheltered many of the
perpetrators of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the governments of Rwanda and Uganda, controlled
by the same people who had suffered during the genocide, launched an invasion of Zaire and
murdered many innocent Hutus alongside the former genocidaires. They used the FLNC as a
front to give their invasion legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. The Angolan
government also joined in the fray. Zaire became a battleground in the Angolan civil war as the
Angolan army fought UNITA guerrillas who had been using Zaire as a staging ground for years.
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The combined foreign and rebel armies managed to overthrow Mobutu, who subsequently fled to
Morocco.148
Eventually, however, the Congolese tired of the occupying Rwandans and Ugandans.
After Laurent Kabila, the former rebel fighter who had led the FLNC for almost forty years
before the 1996 victory over Mobutu, declared that he wanted the foreign armies to leave the
newly renamed “Democratic Republic of the Congo,” Rwanda and Uganda kept their armies in
the Congo by force. This occupation led to a much larger proxy war as most of the Congo’s
neighbors fought a war on its territory. The very situation that American intelligence analysts
had so feared was now coming to pass. The Congolese Westphalian experiment had failed in the
beginning of what became known as the First Congo War.149
Unlike Zia’s alliance with fundamentalists and Noriega’s dealings in drugs, US
diplomatic officials by and large seemed to be unconcerned with the Chinese government’s
influence in Zaire. Indeed, figures like Henry Kissinger and others even looked at Mobutu’s
closeness with the PRC as something that the US could exploit to gain closer ties to the PRC
government. Kissinger would write in 1974, one year after the “opening to China” that Zaire
presented an excellent option for further improving ties with Maoist China. Reagan would
continue Nixon’s policies of openness towards the PRC, viewing China as an important
counterbalance to Soviet power. In his memoirs of his time as a foreign service officer,
Ambassador Brandon Grove did not seem particularly concerned by Chinese diplomatic
presence in the Congo.150
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The Reagan administration’s openness towards the 1980s leadership in China came even
while it recognized that the 1980s Chinese government supplied Gaddafi with weapons. The
Chinese government also played a role in helping the Pakistani government develop its nuclear
program (but perhaps the Reagan administration was too distracted by the mujahideen to notice).
Reagan would visit China in 1984, while the Premier of China, visited Reagan at the White
House in 1985. In these visits, Reagan does not seem to regard the Chinese government with
nearly the same level of suspicion that he does the Soviet Union. Perhaps this was due to Deng
Xiaoping’s privatization reforms during Reagan’s term which pushed China away from the old
Maoist economy towards one deemed more palatable by transnational corporations? Whatever
the case, it is certainly true that Reagan trusted Deng and his reforms more than he trusted
Gorbachev and Perestroika.151
Now, the US-China rivalry has grown to new levels now that the Soviet Union no longer
threatens their northern border. Some diplomatic and political analysts have even wondered
publicly if the United States will enter a new Cold War with China. China’s growing economic
power and increasing acquisition of American debt has worried politicians from both sides of the
political spectrum. Given these developments, one cannot help but wonder why the Reagan
administration did not pay as much attention to China as they did the USSR.152
The Reagan administration also botched their handling of the situation with Muammar
Gaddafi, the very dictator who they were seeking to stop by aiding Mobutu. Like most of the
dictators mentioned in this paper, Gaddafi was only empowered by military actions against his
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government. Gaddafi had been responsible for helping to fund several attacks by the Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO) in Europe. These included the PLO attack on the cruise ship
Achille Lauro and bombings at the international airport in Vienna, Austria. After a PLO militant
backed by Gaddafi set off a bomb in a German discotheque, killing one US soldier, the Reagan
administration decided that it had had enough, and ordered airstrikes in Libya. Similar to the
1989 invasion of Panama, the Reagan administration’s 1986 bombing of Libya was marked by
the disproportionate nature of its attacks. American bombing caused many civilian casualties,
including a child that Gaddafi was able to use for propaganda purposes. The bombing caused the
Libyan people, at the time disillusioned with Gaddafi’s rule, to instead rally behind his regime.
The US bombing, far from inciting the Libyan people to topple Gaddafi, actually saved his
regime. Gaddafi would continue to rule for almost three more decades before being overthrown
in 2011.153
How, then, could Gaddafi have been dealt with? The Soviet Union was starting to see
Gaddafi as more of a public relations liability than a true asset due to the civilians who died in
his terrorist bombings. This factor means that it is possible that Gorbachev may have been open
to a deal designed to curb Gaddafi’s involvement with terrorists. It is possible the USSR might
have tried to extract a concession in exchange for this, but Gaddafi was going to do more damage
to the USSR’s image over the long term than he was going to do to the United States over the
short term.154

153

President Reagan: Speech on Airstrikes Against Libya, 4/14/86, YouTube, Reagan Library, Ian Pannell,
“Fighting for the Spoils of Libya’s Revolution,” BBC News, 1/28/15
154
CIA ERR, Jack Anderson, Joseph Spear, ”Soviets are No Friends of Gaddafi,” Washington Post,
4/24/86

62

Gaddafi’s popularity in Libya was shrinking by 1985 due to what one intelligence analyst
described as a worsening economy and “deteriorating standards of living.”155 Specifically, the
report pointed to an increasingly low supply of food ad other critical supplies. These shortages
were causing rising resentment towards Gaddafi’s rule, which in turn lay behind an increase in
rebel “dissident” activity. Gaddafi reacted to this challenge to his authority by implementing
harsher crackdowns on Libyans who defied his regime. He also “allied himself more firmly with
the hardliners” and replaced career army officers with “young zealots.”156 This was also behind
his funding of foreign insurgent groups like the PLO, as he no doubt believed that support for
these groups would both give him an external enemy against which to rally the Libyan people
(something the US would later give him with the 1986 bombing) as well as aid from allied
countries in the Middle East that might be more inclined to support such causes.157
The CIA further estimated that Gaddafi’s restructuring of the army was likely to anger
military officers who found their standing weakened by the reforms, making them more likely to
rebel against Gaddafi. The agency also found that Libyan dissidents and rebels were getting
increasing assistance from other powers in the region, especially Egypt and Iraq. The CIA was
extremely optimistic about their ability to oust Gaddafi from power. The report put the rebels’
ability to remove Gaddafi from power “better than even.”158
Much like the cases of American aid to Gaddafi and aid to the Afghan mujahideen, the
covert program against Gaddafi became very much the pet project of CIA director Casey. In fact,
many of the other figures in the Iran-Contra scandal would first receive experience in the
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program against Gaddafi. However, their efforts up to 1986 proved to be unsuccessful, meaning
that Reagan had to resort to more extreme means of attempting to remove Gaddafi from power.
In 1986, in response to Libyan involvement of the bombing of LaBelle Discotheque in Berlin,
Reagan ordered a raid against Gaddafi’s headquarters. The airstrike, which was an explicit
attempt to assassinate the Libyan dictator, failed in that objective, but did cause a large amount
of damage to several of his command structures. However, the air raid also damaged the French
embassy in Tripoli, straining relations with an ally who was not only a crucial player in the North
African region, but was also an important member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). Despite the damage caused by the airstrike, Gaddafi was able to stay in power.
Although US intelligence reports suggested that his standing was further weakened by the air
strike, he was still able to stay in power for the next two and a half decades.159
However, an effort at negotiation with the USSR over Gaddafi could have potentially cut
off the dictator from his sources of international support. CIA reports in the 1970s indicated that
ties between the Kremlin and Gaddafi had always been strained by a Gaddafi who resisted
outside influence in any form and by a Soviet Union distrustful of Gaddafi’s methods.
Furthermore, the report suggested that the Soviets considered Libya to be of little strategic
importance. With all these factors at play, it seems likely that there could have been a negotiated
solution between the US and the USSR in order to limit Libyan sponsorship of militantism.160
Finally, there was a third player in the political situation of Central Africa in the 1980s.
Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere had been a leader who had perhaps been one of the most
truly non-aligned leaders in post colonial Africa. Nyerere had played a crucial role in mediating a
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settlement between the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) rebels in
what is now Zimbabwe, the white settler government of what was then called “Rhodesia,” and
the South African backers of the “Rhodesian” government. Although Nyerere had backed the
ZANU-PF forces by arming them and providing them sanctuary in Tanzanian territory, he had
still played a big role in negotiating the agreement that allowed the ZANU-PF to assume power
in the newly renamed country of Zimbabwe. However, this had been during Carter’s term in
office.161
Reagan decided to take a different tack, taking a hardline against Nyerere’s “African
Socialism.” That meant that there was no negotiated solution to the conflict in the Congo. If the
Reagan administration valued Congolese stability, as much as it claimed, it would have made an
agreement with Nyerere a higher priority. However, the fact that it allowed the Congo to undergo
a vicious civil war a decade later shows how truly uncommitted American policymakers were to
Central Africa.162
Conclusion.
Reagan’s legacy as a President runs deeper that a simple list of successes and failures.
Reagan’s new conservative philosophy would come to define a generation of American
politicians, both democrats and republicans, indeed, the climax of Reagan’s financial
deregulation reforms would happen under Democratic President Bill Clinton with the repeal of
the “Glass-Steagel Act” in 1999. The covert actions of the Reagan administration in foreign
policy would evolve into the overt invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan under George H.W Bush’s
son, George W Bush, in the 2000s. The two wars would reverse much of the American public’s
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appetite for hawkishness in foreign policy that Reagan had generated. Globally, this trend of
Reagan’s conservatism would also become embodied into the governance of many Western
European nations, especially the United Kingdom under Margaret Thatcher. Meanwhile,
individuals like Casey, tarnished by their involvement in the Iran-Contra scandal, slipped from
the scene entirely. Oliver North too, would prove to be a temporary figure. After being pardoned
by HW Bush before Bush left office in 1993, North would run for a Senate seat in Virginia the
following year. Despite the incredible successes of the Republican Party in the 1994 midterm
elections, North would lose his election for Senate. Jeanne Kirkpatrick would toy with the idea
of a run for president of her own in 1988. However, she decided against it, and George HW Bush
would win the Republican Party nomination and then the presidency.163
Bush himself would have a turbulent presidency. After winning the 1988 election despite
having the cloud of his involvement with Noriega follow him throughout much of the campaign,
he would initially be a popular leader. Although it was widely condemned by human rights
organizations, the invasion of Panama would be met with praise from a majority of the American
people. Bush’s popularity would reach still further heights when he launched an invasion of
Kuwait in order to remove Iraqi forces who had been occupying the country for the past months.
Nevertheless, Bush would lose reelection after the economy began to slow down. His son,
George W Bush, would later become president in 2001, taking Reagan’s neoconservatism to an
even more extreme level in his “war on terror.”164
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What are we to make of Reagan himself? After leaving the presidency in 1989, he would
retire to his California ranch, where he lived until his death in 2006. His mourners saw him as the
President who brought down the Soviet Union and ushered in a new age of American
dominance. His detractors would remember him as a warmonger who damaged American
standing in the rest of the world. But perhaps both of these interpretations give Reagan too much
credit. His lack of experience in international affairs left a dangerous void in terms of foreign
policy savvy. This void would eventually be filled by Casey, Weinberger, and the other
hardliners, and they would not relinquish it until the Iran-Contra scandal in 1986. Reagan was
not the mythical president who brought down an “evil empire,” but the man was quite frankly far
out of his depth in foreign policy.165
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